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The ‘total information system' serving every possible
need of all the departments of a company is a goal
eagerly pursued by many businesses. Are they mov
ing too fast and too optimistically? The authors say
they are —

INTEGRATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS—

SHADOW OR SUBSTANCE?
by Peter P. Schoderbek
The University of Iowa

and Stephen E. Schoderbek
United States Air Force Academy
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information rather than providing
information for management. In the
former instance (and, incidentally,
many of today’s systems are still
designed with this objective in
mind) the information system is
concerned with the rapid collection,
processing, and display of data
which often have little to do with
decision making. In the latter in
stance, information not only is col
lected but also is restructured to
reduce the uncertainty inherent in
decision making.
It is not too difficult to see why
the notion of a total system re
ceived so much attention . . . and
so much abuse. The notion of inte
grated information systems no
27

There has been some integration of data in many organizations, but for the most part. . .

doubt had its origins in integrated
data processing systems. Since raw
data gathered from separate infor
mation centers could be used for
more than one decision making
function, many felt that further
technological advancements would
lead to totally integrated systems.
Efforts have been made in many
companies to design a total data
base and then to use that base to
generate the necessary information.
To be sure, there has been some
integration of data in many organi
zations, but, for the most part, this
has been true only for those sys
tems utilizing the same kinds of
related data. This similarity of in
puts is one of the requirements of
an integrated system; if compatibil
ity of data does not exist, the sys
tem is not integrated. But before
information systems can be inte
grated, the models which accept,
process, and analyze such informa
tion must first be integrated; only
then can one even commence to
discuss integrated systems.
The fact that compatibility may
not exist in all the subsystems does
not negate the entire concept of
integration but rather coerces one
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to define initially the boundaries of
the system. Thus, one does not
have an integrated system in the
true sense of the word, i.e., “to form
into a whole,” but rather a limited
integrated system; the system
simply is not a total (or holistic)
one. Thus, it may be said then that
the degree of integration is some
what dependent upon the design
of the system.
In the initial stages of designing
a management information system,
the designers typically ask manag
ers what information is required
for their decisions. Such a question
implies that the managers can iden
tify the important variables in
volved in the process, assuming at
the same time that the availability
of this information will lead to bet
ter decisions.
There is much weighty evidence
to the contrary. There is also evi
dence that many managers cannot
reduce the decision making proc
ess to quantifiable expressions.
This may not be an unwillingness
on the part of the managers to co
operate, but rather a genuine in
ability to comply, since in order to
identify the information that one
needs, one must first have a model
of how he makes decisions. Until
a model of this process exists one
cannot specify the information re
quired, and, too often, mathemati
cal concepts cannot capture the ex
pressions of human values which
often dictate decisions. Thus,
neither simply the abundance of
information nor mathematical ex
pressions generally reflect human
decisons. The lack of useful mod
els in general obviously limits the
integration of them in attempting
to develop information systems.
For the most part, the interac
tions of the major functions of the
organization have not been duly
noted in the design stage of infor
mation systems. Typically what
occurs is that the organization is

wrenched apart and divided into
its principal functions and sub
functions. This is what has ac
counted for the superabundance
of systems—production information
systems, marketing information
systems, and so on. To further
compound the situation the above
functions are further splintered
into inventory systems, scheduling
systems, market research systems,
forecasting systems, and a host of
others specialized for each duly
important function. When one at
tempts to integrate these many
systems, all designed for varying
and specific purposes, each possibly
using a different mode of informa
tion, the result is inevitable. The
multiplicity of subsystems which
may use separate data bases sug
gests that different kinds of infor
mation are required, and while
some information centers may be
created for external reporting,
others will surely be utilized for
operating decisions, and still others
for planning or forecasting pur
poses. There is nothing inher
ently incorrect in developing sub
systems independently of each
other as long as they retain their
capability for interfacing.
In discussing a problem where
each system was designed by
the systems group residing within
the individual organizations, Clin
ton Williams of Chrysler Corpo
ration recently stated:
Each organization took a pa
rochial view of their own re
quirements without regard to
the impact of these systems on
the total business. This is not
a unique example. I could cite
many others. This problem
was eventually resolved by a
central staff with total corpo
rate planning responsibility.
Such a staff is necessary to
build an M.I.S. in a big com
pany. Some companies have atManagement Adviser

. . . this has been true only for those systems using the same kinds of related data

tempted to solve this problem
by centralizing systems design.
This satisfies the requirement
of looking at the corporate
view but creates a more seri
ous problem; that of not being
responsive to the needs of the
individual organizations. Cen
tral planning combined with
decentralized systems design
offers the best combination for
big business organizations.1
Even the task of delineating an
MIS for a large organization is a
formidable one, much less integrat
ing it. Says Williams:

The job of defining an informa
tion system for a large com
pany is an enormous undertak
ing. We have 160 computers
installed in our company,
world-wide, supporting such
diverse products as cars,
trucks, boats, air conditioners,
chemicals, tanks and missiles,
and subsidiary companies en
gaged in commercial credit,
land development, and car
leasing. The thought of putting
this into an overall M.I.S.
scheme staggers the imagina
tion.2
A common area of disagreement
is what does and what does not
constitute an integrated system. It
would not be difficult to point out
obvious dissimilarities from authors
and practitioners alike. Some
would define an integrated system
as including both on line and real
time considerations (OLRT). In
William Crowley’s view, if a system
is integrated, it will:
1 Clinton C. Williams, “Practical Prob
lems of M.I.S. in a Business Environ
ment,” paper presented at the First An
nual Meeting of the American Institute
for Decision Sciences. New Orleans, La.,
Oct. 30-31, 1969, pp. 3-4.
2 op. cit. p. 4.
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1. Supply historical data and
analysis of that data.
2. Supply “on line” data, that
is, factual material picked right
out of the system as fast as it
is generated.
3. Supply data in “real time,”
fast enough so that manage
ment can exercise necessary
management control instantly.3
Others appraise the merits of real
time information systems as pro
ducers of instant and relevant in
formation. Pattillo states:

On line real time information
systems are upon us. The ben
efits to be derived focus mainly
around the “instant informa
mation” aspect. At any time
we are able to query the com
puter and receive up-to-date
information on any desired
phase of the business. The in
formation system may be lim
ited or total. It may deal with
financial information only, or
the system may include data
on all functions of the busi
ness. . . 4
If integrated systems were to em
brace the elements suggestive of a
more sophisticated computer sys
tem, the task would be no more
formidable since an on line real
time system of itself does not im
ply an integrated system. Many
firms with real time capability do
not thereby claim to have an inte
grated system. Indeed, most of the

applications of real time systems
were bom of critical but very spe
cialized problems.
Some authorities rather than de
manding the presence of a real
time requirement for an integrated
system even question the legitimacy
of the entire concept. In a provoc
ative article, Dearden, after rele
gating the functions of manage
ment to six categories, concludes
that real time is of value only for
controlling certain logistic sys
tems.5 While Dearden has been ac
cused of fabricating a straw man
(and to some extent this is cer
tainly true), nevertheless, he does
address himself to some penetrat
ing questions for the systems man.
The salient point he rightly makes
is that the concept of an integrated
system does not depend upon the
use of real time hardware for pro
ducing instantaneous information.
He unmistakably scores the point
that many organizations do not
need real time systems and at the
present time cannot justify exten
sive use of them; moreover, the
attempt to achieve an integrated
system does not cut down on the
problems at all. Williams also
makes the same point:
Our major batch systems have
daily update. This gives us a
lot of flexibility for producing
needed information with high
response timing. Not very
many information require
ments have been established
that require higher response
than this.6
One of the more formidable ob-

3 William J. Crowley, “Can We Inte
grate Systems Without Integrating Man
agement?” Journal of Data Processing,
August, 1966, reprinted in The Com
puter Sampler, McGraw-Hill Book Com
pany, New York, 1968, p. 272.
4 James W. Pattillo, “A Study in Instant
Information,” Management Accounting,
May, 1969, p. 17. (Emphasis by the
authors.)

5 John Dearden, “The Myth of RealTime Management Information,” Har
vard Business Review, May-June, 1966.
Also see John Dearden and F. Warren
McFarland, Management Information
Systems, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Home
wood, Ill., 1966.
6 Williams, op. cit., p. 5.
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It is because of the varied and unpredictable nature of data required for strategic planning . . .

stacles to an integrated manage
ment system is the unproductive
ness of insight into the nonrepeti
tive decision making process of the
data generated by systems reports.
Since some hold that information
is imperfect whenever it is unavail
able, or too costly, or unproductive
of knowledge, the reason why
many systems do not generate in
sightful information may be that
much of the information actually
utilized in the decision making
process is information external to
the firm. In many cases this exter
nal information dictates decisions
irrespective of internal conditions.
Robert Anthony succinctly states
this:

Daniel, in his oft-quoted article,
“Management Information Crises,”8
states that a dynamic management
information system requires infor
mation of three types: environ
mental information, competitive in
formation, and internal information.
Even if management were able to
successfully integrate the internal
information, it would be impracti
cal for a firm to attempt to synthe
size a system with input data based
upon continually changing political,
economic, and environmental fac
tors as well as data relating to the
past, present, and probably future
activities of direct and indirect
competition. Anthony makes the
same point when he writes:

It is because of the varied
and unpredictable nature of
data required for strategic
planning that an attempt to
design an all-purpose internal
information system is probably
hopeless. For the same reason,
the dream of some computer
specialists of a gigantic bank,
from which planners can ob
tain all the information they
wish by pressing some buttons,
is probably no more than a
dream.7

Strategic planning relies heav
ily on external information,
that is, on data collected more
from outside the company,
such as market analyses, esti
mates of costs and other fac
tors involved in building a
plant in a new locality, techno
logical developments and so
on. . . . Strategic planning and
management control activities
tend to conflict with one an
other in some respects.9

It is noteworthy that typically the
higher the decision making in the
organization, the more judgmental
the factors involved. Decisions
made at the levels of middle man
agement and above are more in re
sponse to external pressures upon
the firm than to indigenous factors.
Those systems which purport to
employ a central data base, for the
most part, do so for decisions made
either at the lower management
level or those which are repetitive.

Recent studies show an increas
ing awareness of the importance of
this external information. Aguilar
in his recent book, Scanning the
Business Environment, examined
the kinds, sources, and modes of
external information that execu
tives use for strategic decision
making.10 He found that for large

7 Robert N. Anthony, Planning and Con
trol Systems: A Framework for Analysis,
Graduate School of Business Administra
tion, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Mass., 1965, p. 45.
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8 D. Roman Daniel, “Management In
formation Crises,” Harvard Business Re
view, September-October, 1961, p. 55.
9 Robert N. Anthony, “Framework for
Analysis,” Management Services, MarchApril, 1964, p. 21.
10 Francis J. Aguilar, Scanning the Busi
ness Environment, Macmillan Company,
New York, 1967.

companies 51 per cent of the in
formation utilized for strategic de
cisions came from sources external
to the organization, while 49 per
cent of the information came from
internal sources.11 Keegan exam
ined the sources and the manner
in which executives at headquarters
level learn about the significant op
portunities and threats to their
companies.12 He found that docu
ments were the source of only 27
per cent of the important external
information received by executives.
He also states:

The bulk (60%) of these docu
ments are publications and in
formation service reports from
outside the company. Letters
and reports from inside sources
account for the remaining
40%.13

Those enamored with the inte
grated systems concept are often
unaware of the heavy financial
commitment required. Many man
agers have been sold on the notion
that with a totally integrated sys
tem they would be able to query
the computer and receive answers
to virtually any question they de
sire. Even if such a system were
possible, and it is not, this would
require a monumental data base
and a special computer access lan
guage. Such a course of action
could hardly be justified in regard
to the time-cost expenditure rela
tive to the benefits received. Sev
eral years of developmental time is
11 Ibid., p. 80.
12 Warren J. Keegan, “Acquisition of
Global Business Information,” Columbia
Journal of World Business, March-April,
1968, pp. 35-41. See also Warren J.
Keegan, “The Scanning of International
Business Environment: A Study of the
Information Acquisition Process,” unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Har
vard University, June, 1967.
13 Ibid., p. 37.
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.. . that an attempt to design an all-purpose internal information system is probably hopeless

common just with modular sys
tems, let alone a system purport
ing to include all relevant data.
Characteristically, the cost of an
installation and its payoff will dic
tate the degree of integration that
is feasible, and in many instances
the computer may be cost-justified
for only one or two functional
areas. For these firms, then, the op
timal degree of integration has
been achieved at that particular
point in time. On the other hand,
the attempt to tie together the en
tire information flow would be
economically unwise. The great
effort expended, regardless of the
hardware sophistication, would be
enormously disproportionate to the
benefits produced.
This splintering-up approach to
information systems is one which
often has been derided as ignoring
future requirements of the firm. On
the contrary, it can be said that
management seldom fully ignores
future benefits but rather that it
discounts the value of these bene
fits and hence seems to rely upon
the more verifiable short-run val
ues.14 The number of firms that
have attempted complete integra
tion of information (often with the
computer manufacturer’s warran
ties and vows of assistance) only to
experience absolute failure is not
insignificant. These firms, under
standably, do not draw the wide
attention to their misadventures
they deserve.
It is suggested that the acquisi
tion and operation of an integrated
management information system be
viewed in the same light as the
purchase and operation of an addi14 A firm in the farm implement industry
just announced “that they were aban
doning their efforts to integrate their in
ternational operations because of both
problems encountered in the endeavor
and the tremendous high cost relative
to benefits expected.”
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tional amount of capital equipment.
Both actions can and often do in
volve large amounts of financial re
sources. If the purchase of capital
must be verified as cost-effective,
an information system should also
contribute its share to profit. Obvi
ously, the verification of benefits
from any integrated management
information system is difficult, but
certainly it is not impossible. Sys
tematic analysis of the almost un
limited volume of output will not
only expand the initial list of prob
able benefits but will help to ensure
that the system is earning its keep.
The literature is replete with arti
cles dealing with resistance to
change, psychology for the systems
analyst, and the like. And yet, in
spite of this overabundance of ad
vice, engineering acceptance of
change is a major factor in the
reception given information sys
tems. While this is especially true
for advanced installations, which
necessarily employ operations re
search personnel for model build
ing and simulation, the same prob
lems exist for initial installations.
It could be expected that firms
“learn” to deal with these “human”
problems before advanced applica
tions, but this is not the case.
Churchman, in regard to why rec
ommendations by O.R. personnel
are not accepted by management,
notes:
These reflections imply that
the missing ingredient in the
process of implementation is
the understanding of the man
ager. Any research team that
fails to study the manager and
his personality may well fail to
bring about a recommended
change.15
15 C. West Churchman, “Managerial Ac
ceptance of Scientific Recommendations,”
California Management Review, Fall,
1964, p. 35.

There is much evidence to sup
port the fact that many information
systems now in existence remain
on the shelf unused. Chambers
states concerning a production in
formation system:
We developed a very sophisti
cated model for the finishing
operations at that plant (fin
ishing is a semicontinuous op
eration there). The model
takes into account not only the
speed of the production lines,
inventories at various stages,
order quantities, and labor
smoothing, but also how the
kilns are loaded. There are
about six or seven control vari
ables, and the model very
closely approximates reality. It
has optimizing features, where
possible, and involves some
simulation. However, the plant
is not using it because they
don’t understand what is in the
model and how it works. We
have found that unless we get
people to understand what we
have done, and unless we de
velop the model or system
slowly, it isn’t going to be
used.16

He makes the point that if a sys
tem is developed sequentially and
the managers are allowed to ab
sorb it on a piecemeal basis, then
there is a higher probability of suc
cess. This is especially true where
the decision making function is
highly complex. It is also common
knowledge that when change is
understood, resistance to it is less
formidable.
16 John C. Chambers, “Total Versus Mod
ular Information Systems: Empirical Ex
perience in Finance and Personnel,”
Management Information Systems for the
1970’s, Robert D. Smith (ed.), Center
for Business and Economic Research,
Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, 1970,
pp. 52-53.
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At a recent symposium on simu
lation it was stated in regard to a
sophisticated corporate model:

The quest for a total
integrated system is sheer

folly as well as misleading.

The quantum jump from
modular subsystems to one
“holistic” system is neither

financially nor technically
feasible at this time.

. . . We would like to cite this
evidence, but we cannot. The
reason that we can’t is that we
do not have a data bank of in
teractive estimates, because no
analyst is currently using this
system. This is despite the fact
that the model has been in a
finished form for almost nine
months, and has been intro
duced to approximately one
hundred security analysts and
four different organizations, in
cluding the Security Analysts
of------------------- Bank. Obvi
ously, something has gone very
wrong: a large amount of
money has been spent to de
velop a product which is sit
ting on the shelf unused.
The model was not, however,
“human engineered” by some
one familiar with the thought
processes of a non-computeroriented user. ... Furthermore,
the user was provided with
very little assistance as to how
he was to derive the imputs to
this model: how is an analyst
to be expected to make proba
bilistic forecasts, when this
represents to him an entirely
new mode of thought?17
Traditional managers, who have
had neither the exposure nor the
training to adequately cope with
computer technology, are over
whelmed by this new vehicle, which
they rightly or wrongly perceive as
a threat to their decision making
prerogatives. Even when training
has narrowed the gap slightly, it
has by no means bridged the
chasm. Besides, many of the train
ing programs are of little benefit to
the participants since they are oneshot operations which do not pro
17 Wayne H. Wagner et al., “Telecom
munications Earnings Estimation Model
(TEEM): An Evaluation,” paper pre
sented at Symposium on Corporate Sim
ulation Models, Seattle, Wash., March
23-25, 1970.
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vide in-depth knowledge of the
system. It is not enough simply to
know what information to ask for
and how to read computer print
outs. If a manager is to evaluate a
system, he must know some of the
inner workings of the system.18
A major division exists both in
theory and practice concerning in
tegrated management information
systems. The authors suggest that
this is so because of a failure to
describe precisely not only the
scope of the system itself but also
the types of decisions toward which
the system must be designed. At
the one extreme is the all-embrac
ing integrated system with inputs
of objective data based upon con
tinually changing political, eco
nomic, and environmental factors,
as well as data relating to past,
present, and probably future activi
ties of the firm and its competitors.
At the other extreme lies a system
with a capability to provide an
analysis of only segmented internal
data. The degree of systems so
phistication even at this end will
be difficult to achieve since true
integration will require the formi
dable meshing of many modular
subsystems. Notwithstanding the
often-cited examples of several
major firms that have had some
measure of success with integrated
logistic systems, progress has been
modest.
In any event, the quest for a
total integrated system is sheer
folly as well as misleading. The
quantum jump from modular sub
systems to one “holistic” system is
neither financially nor technically
feasible at this time. It is hoped
that the steady flow of literature
on “total” systems will be slowed
and the hypnotic attraction will dis
sipate as the slow integration of
modular subsystems proceeds in
industry. As this occurs, the con
cept of integrated systems will be
come a substantive one instead of
mere shadows.
18 This point is succinctly made in Rus
sell L. Ackoff's article, “Management
Misinformation System,” Management
Science, December, 1967.
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